The Municipal Corporation and Conflicts Over Extraterritorial Acquisitions: The Need for Land Planning by Phay, Robert
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 17 
Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1964 Article 1 
3-1964 
The Municipal Corporation and Conflicts Over Extraterritorial 
Acquisitions: The Need for Land Planning 
Robert Phay 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Land Use Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert Phay, The Municipal Corporation and Conflicts Over Extraterritorial Acquisitions: The Need for 
Land Planning, 17 Vanderbilt Law Review 347 (1964) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol17/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 17 M~cn, 1964 NuMBER 2
The Municipal Corporation and Conflicts
Over Extraterritorial Acquisitions:
The Need for Land Planning
Robert Phay
Among the most crucial problems produced by the rapid growth of
urban and metropolitan America are those conflicts which arise when
a municipality attempts to take property lying outside its territorial
limits and within the boundaries of another governmental unit, or when
another governmental unit attempts an acquisition within a municipality.
In this article the author studies such conflicts in detail, demon-
strating that the cases fall into a coherent pattern when viewed
functionally. He concludes with a discussion of proposals for regional
planning as a means of resolving these conflicts at the least cost to the
parties, while promoting the most desirable allocation of land resources.
The metropolitan areas in America experienced a substantial and
rapid influx of population from the beginning of the industrial revolu-
tion in the early nineteenth century to the commencement of World
War I.1 Following the war, however, the movement reversed itself
as the nation entered the age of suburbs and giant shopping centers.
Bulging at their centers, the cities, spurred by the decentralization and
expansion of industrial and commercial facilities and the disenchant-
ment of urban dwellers, sent people and buildings spilling over
municipal boundaries to the surrounding areas 2 The result has been
an "urban sprawl' 3 creating metropolitan regions in the nature of
supercities which, in the case of the Atlantic coast, stretch from Boston
1. GAuoN, THE UBAN PATrERN 63 (1950). See also 1 McQurmraN, MNiciAL
CoRpoRAONs § 1.99 (3d ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as McQunML_].
2. As one commentator noted: "The growth of large centers of population and the
speed at which they have spread, overflowing their boundaries, and forming sprawling
agglomerations of buildings and people are products of modem times." BARTHOLOMEW,
LAND UsES iN AMERIcAN CrrIs 1 (1955).
3. Whyte, Are Cities Un-American?, Fortune, Sept. 1957, p. 123.
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to Washington, D.C.4 "Urban sprawl," the term generally applied to
-this phenomenon, properly suggests that the process was largely un-
.planned and uncoordinated.5 Furthermore, it has been so rapid that,
in the words of Chicago's mayor, Richard Daley, it was "impossible
to plan for the economical disposition of the great influx of people,
surging like a human tide to spread itself wherever opportunity for
profitable labor offered place."6
The principal impact of this growth has been to accelerate the con-
flicting desires and interests of neighboring municipalities. In many
cases this is a conflict between the central city and its suburban area,
a factor to be kept in mind in the ensuing survey of city-county con-
flicts. In other cases it may be a conflict between established cities,
and in still others a conflict arising between the municipality and a
state or even the federal government. In any case, with these types
of conflicts has come a corresponding increase in the competition for
the use of the same area.9 It is apparent that municipalities, which are
not self-sufficient entities and whose boundaries are often "hazy, un-
certain, and elastic,"10 will often not be able to satisfy all their munici-
pal ;ieeds within their territorial limits." For example, they may need
to obtain extraterritorial property in order to erect adequate water
supply facilities, to build bridges and ferries, and to locate installations
or institutions such as parks and sewage disposals.'2 In such situations
4. Tunnard, Americas Super Cities, Harpers', Aug. 1958, p. 59. For an excellent
examination of the metropolitan areas and their problems see CouNcm OF STATE Cov-
EmR uxs, THE STA=s AmD r MmoPOLrrAN PROBLEM (1956).
5. See generally The Exploding Metropolis, a series of four articles: Whyte, Are Cties
Un-American?, Fortune, Sept. 1957, p. 123; Bello, The City and the Car, Fortune, Oct.
1957, p. 157; Bello, New Strength in City Hall, Fortune, Nov. 1957, p. 156; Seligman,
The Enduring Slums, Fortune, Dec. 1957 p. 144.
. 6. Daley, Governmental Developments in Metropolitan Areas: 1, in UNrrED STATs
CONFEmuNCE Op MAYORS, Crry PRoBLr.sns 25 (1962).
7. Improvement in transportation facilities is another factor which has tended to ac-
celerate conflicts between different governmental units. For example, the city of Denver
bwns peaks in the Rocky Mountains over sixty miles from the city for the recreation of
its citizens. See Smer., Tun LAw oF OPEN SPACE 19 (1960).
8. See Bocue, THE STRucr or Tm MEmrororrA ComimuNrrY (1949).
9. See IiGHBEE, THE SQLTuzE-Crrins WrrmouT SPACE (1960), which dramatizes the
competition for space and the paucity of open space that exists today around our metro-
politan areas. See also Sears, The Inexorable Problem of Space, 127 ScmcE 9 (1958);
SmeGEr, op. cit. supra note 7, for the best legal analysis of the problems which arise in
attempts to acquire open space.
10. Andersoii, The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10 MINN. L. Rzv. 564, 582 (1926).
11. As one commentator has remarked, the fractioning of the urban areas into sepa-
rate corporate jurisdictions has created many of the difficulties with which our munici-
palities are now confronted. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957).
12. Municipalities are not self sufficient and frequently must go beyond their terri-
torial boundaries "to obtain an adequate watqr supply; to locate installations or institu-
tions of various kinds, such as parks and sewage disposal works; their bridges and
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a conflict may arise between the city proposing the use and another
governmental unit which either needs the property or is already using
it. In such instances the opposing governmental units, representing
different desires and objectives for the planned future of the area,
come into conflict.Y3 It is these conflicts, arising when a municipality
attempts to use property outside its territorial limits which is in the
jurisdictional boundaries of another governmental unit, or when
another governmental unit attempts an acquisition within the mun
cipality, that this article will examine. Recommendations will then be
made for the resolution of these conflicts at the least cost to the
parties, while promoting the most desirable allocation of the land re-
sources.
The conflicts which arise between different governmental units in-
volve questions of power, loss of revenue, inconsistent zoning statutes,
and actions challenged as arbitrary. However, basic to all these con-
flicts is the problem of conflicting desires for land use. In other words,
any challenge made to a proposed taking is one in which the political
unit affected by the taking objects because of supposed injury to its
own development, interests, or present governmental functions. The
problem can thus be seen as actually concerning the proper allocation
of land-a study in land planning, the ultimate objective being, ac-
cording to McDougal and Rotival, "the creation of an integrated and
balanced community org'anism so moulded and organized as to make
the fullest and most effective use of its human and material resources
for the achievement of basic democratic values."14 With this land
planning goal in mind, a survey will be made of the types of con-
flicts with which courts have dealt in the past when one governmental
unit has attempted to take property located within another.
I. AcQuisrnoNs BY TE MuN ciPALrry
A. In Counties and Other Municipalities
The conflicts which have arisen when cities have attempted to ac-
quire property extraterritorially from state governmental units (bor-
oughs, municipal corporations, counties) can be divided into-'two
categories. In the first the proposed taking involves property of an
individual or a corporation which is'neither being used nor necessary
ferries often extend into outside areas, and nuisances near the boraers need abatement
to protect health, safety, and welfare of municipal residefits." These problems are
especially acute in urban areas. MADox, ExTATmurrorhAL Powias OF MuNICa. Au-
Tiss I TI= UNrr=n STATns 1 (1955).
13. For a discussion of conflicts within cities see Norton, Elimination of Incompatible
Uses and Structures, 20 LAw & CoNTM. PROB. 304 (1955).
14. McDourJAL & RoTivAL, THE CASE FOn REGIONAL PLANNING (1947).
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for a public purpose. The second category concerns property which
has been dedicated to or is presently being used for public purposes.
With respect to the first category, courts have allowed a city to
condemn such property where the power to condemn is specifically
granted. Illustrative is City of Eugene v. Johnson,5 an Oregon case
where the state by statute had given its municipalities the power to
appropriate private property outside the corporate limits for the pur-
pose of supplying its suburban inhabitants with water, power, and
electric services. There is little doubt as to the legality of this type
of action 6 where the central city is supplying its suburbs with services
such as water, sewage disposal, and emergency fire protection."7
Furthermore, this power exists even when there are conflicting county
or borough zoning ordinances. 8 In Aviation Services v. Board of
Adjustment 9 a municipality was successful in having a zoning law of
a neighboring township declared inapplicable to the municipality's air-
port located within the boundaries of the township. Similar results
have been reached even where one village condemned land in another
town for a public bathing beach20 and where a town wanted to con-
struct a sewage disposal plant contrary to another town's zoning regu-
lations.2'
A question does arise, however, as to the legitimacy of such a power
where there is no express grant of authority. "As a rule," says Lewis
in his treatise on eminent domain, "a municipal corporation cannot
condemn property beyond its limits, unless authority so to do is
expressly given."2? Despite this general rule against extraterritorial
acquisitions without express delegation, there has been a growing
15. 183 Ore. 421, 192 P.2d 251 (1948). For other cases see 11 McQUILLMN § 32.66
n.38.
16. See Potts v. City of Atlanta, 137 Ga. 211, 73 S.E. 397 (1911), which permitted
a city to condemn property outside its limits where authorized by statute. See also City
of Hawthorne v. Peebles, 166 Cal. App. 2d 758, 333 P.2d 442 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
17. It is common for central cities to supply these types of services for their suburban
areas. Extraterritorial control over subdivisions and outlying areas has been granted by
several statutes. See, e.g., IowA CoDE ANN. § 409.14 (1951); Mcm. Coa,. LAws §
125.36 (1948); ORE. BRv. STAT. § 92.042 (1955).
18. This power also applies when the proposed use is contrary to the municipality's
own zoning requirements. See Mayor of Savannah v. Collins, 211 Ca. 191, 84 S.E.2d
454 (1954).
19. 20 NJ. 275, 119 A.2d 761 (1956).
20. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Town of Huntington, 4 N.Y.2d 182, 149
N.E.2d 851 (1958). See also Decatur Park Dist. v. Becker, 368 IMI. 442, 14 N.E.2d
490 (1938); Green County v. City of Monroe, 3 Wis. 2d 196, 87 N.W.2d 827 (1958).
21. State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960). In an even more
extreme case, the court in Conners v. City of New Haven, 101 Conn. 191, 125 AtI. 375
(1924), upheld an acquisition by New Haven in the adjacent town of Orange for a
park even though the town of Orange was given no notice and was not made a party
to the pending condemnation proceeding.
22. LEwis, EMnrmqT DomAIN § 371, at 681 (3d ed. 1909).
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tendency for courts to find implied powers of acquisition.23 This
development has largely resulted from the increasing amount of state
legislation giving cities a general power to acquire property (usually
this power extends to property lying at a distance from the city of
from one to twelve miles) beyond the corporate limits.P In a similar
manner courts have implied the power to condemn for sewage outlets,-
drainage outlets,2 and the grading and widening of streets27 outside
the municipal boundaries. Thus, one can argue that if the exercise of
a power can be found to perform a public function inside corporate
limits, and the power is either expressly stated in a statute, charter, or
constitution, or can be implied therefrom, the municipality should be
able to acquire property extraterritorially to carry out this function.
The basis for this power, it has been suggestedm stems from the
general powers of a city to purchase or condemn by eminent domain
that property necessary to effectuate its public functions.2 To the
23. In City of North Sacramento v. Citizens Util. Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 482, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 538 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961), a proceeding to condemn a water supply system of de-
fendant Citizens Utilities Company located in part beyond the corporate limits, the court
held that since the power existed within the corporate limits to maintain a water supply
system, by necessary implication that power extended beyond the municipal boundaries,
as essential to the objects and purposes of the municipality. A similar result was reached
by a Texas court in New Braufels v. San Antonio, 212 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948). Here the municipality was attempting to condemn property outside its corporate
limits in order to erect a utility plant. The court implied the power from a state statute
authorizing the proceeding and function within the city limits. See also Colorado Cent.
Power Co. v. City of Englewood, 89 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1937); Ex parte City of
Bessemer, 240 Ala. 52, 197 So. 20 (1940).
24. See MADDOX, op. cit. supra note 12, at 87. Some statutes have been even more
lenient. A Kentucky statute, for example, allows cities to adopt a plan for the physical
development of the municipality and then to acquire property pursuant to this plan in
the "planning area." Ky. REv. STAT. § 100.650 (1963). "Planning area" is defined as
"the city and adjoining territory which by reason of existing or future development
bears relation to the proper growth and development of the city." Ky. RIEv. STAT. §
100.314 (1963). Similarly, a New Jersey statute allows a city to acquire property for
a municipal purpose, whether the property is "within or without the municipality."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:60-2 (1937). It does so without specifying how far outside this
power extends.
25. McBean v. City of Fresno, 112 Cal. 159, 44 Pac. 358 (1896); City of Rockford
v. Mower, 259 I1. 604, 102 N.E. 1032 (1913); Maywood Co. v. Village of Maywood,
140 IM. 216, 29 N.E. 704 (1892); Cochran v. Village of Park Ridge, 138 Ill. 295, 27
N.E. 939 (1891); City of Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474 (1877); see 11 McQum-
TiN § 31.16.
26. City and County of Denver v. Board of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 156 P.2d 101,
106 (1945); Warner v. Town of Gunnison, 2 Colo. App. 430, 31 Pac. 238 (1892);
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Town of Fairfax, 180 Okla. 326, 69 P.2d 649 (1937).
27. Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 72 Cal. App. 2d 638,
652, 165 P.2d 741, 749 (1946); City of Grand Rapids v. Coit, 149 Mich. 668, 113
N.W. 362 (1907).
28. 1 NicHOLs, EmrnT DomAiN § 3.21[1] (3d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as
NwcHoLs].
29. These two powers are not, however, coterminous. As Nichols states, "The right
to exercise the power of eminent domain [by a municipality outside its territorial limits]
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same degree that it can acquire property within its corporate limits for
public functions it should be permitted to acquire property outside
its boundaries for the same purposes.
The second type of extraterritorial acquisition by municipal cor-
porations from other governmental units is that where the property in
question either has been dedicated to or is presently being used for
public purposes. As would be expected, property of a governmental
unit presently being used for a public purpose is, in practically all
cases, immune from a taking by another municipal corporation. 30 Il-
lustrative is City of Edwardsville v. Madison County,3 ' an action to
condemn a strip of land through the Madison County poor farm for
a street. The court held that the municipality's power to condemn
property was limited to private property and did not extend to prop-
erty "already devoted to the public use."3 If this limitation did not
exist, the court warned, "the city might condemn the courthouse square
for an enginehouse, the school district might condemn the engine-
house for a schoolhouse, the county might condemn the schoolhouse
for a courthouse, and an endless chain of condemnations by various
municipalities might be set in operation."
Although the response of this court represents the general rule in
eminent domain takings of this nature,34 other courts have modified
their reluctance and have permitted a condemnation of publicly used
property if the taking is consistent with the property and will not
interfere with the present public use.3 Thus in City of Boston V.
Inhabitants of Brookline,- the town of Brookline was allowed to
condemn land and construct a public road along a strip of land
taken by the city of Boston for the purpose of laying its water pipes.
The court stated that "if the location of a way over land already
. . . requires even more express and clear a grant than does the power to acquire by
ordinary methods." 1 Nicnos § 2.24, at 183. See also Leeds v. City of Richmond,
102 Ind. 372, 1 N.E. 711 (1885).
30. 1 NicHons § 2.24, at 184; id. § 2.24 n.6 (Supp. 1963).
31. 251 Ill. 265, 96 N.E. 238 (1911).
32. Id. at 267, 96 N.E. at 238.
33. Ibid.
34. A similar result was reached by the trial court in an action by the city of Cin-
cinnati when it attempted to condemn for an airport a neighboring municipality's high-
way, Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 166 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio C.P. 1960),
rev'd, 173 Ohio St. 345, 182 N.E.2d 557 (1962). See also McCullough v. Board of
Educ., 51 Cal. 418 (1876), where a public square in a village was held immune from
condemnation for a schoolhouse site and City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry., 67 IUI.
540 (1873), forbidding a condemnation of a public square for a railroad track.
35. The question of permitting condemnation of property already acquired by con-
demnation if it is for the same or similar use first arose in the context of property
located within the territorial boundaries of the condemning party. See City of Salem v.
Marion County, 171 Ore. 254, 137 P.2d 977 (1943), a condemnation of a water system
by the city.
36. 156 Mass. 172, 30 N.E. 611 (1892).
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devoted to a public use would not be inconsistent or materially inter-
fere with such use, there would seem to be no good reason, in the
absence of any provision expressly or by implication forbidding it,
why a way might not be laid out over such land under the general
authority given to cities and towns or county commissioners." 37
Thus far it appears as though the courts have been able to find a
logical justification for permitting or disallowing a proposed con-
demnation while maintaining the sanctity of the municipal line.
Through the judicially created dichotomy of public property and
private property the courts found a means of justifying their actions.
Later when it became apparent that this approach was too inhibiting,
the response was a principle of consistency: If the proposed use was
consistent with the present use, the condemning party could proceed
even if the property in question was presently being used for a public
purpose. However, not to lend credence to an illusion of structural
rationality, there are cases where a court, in apparent total contradic-
tion to City of Edwardsville v. Madison County,8 has permitted a
condemnation where the proposed use not only was inconsistent but
also would destroy the present use. Thus, in Howard v. City of
Atlanta39 the court permitted the city of Atlanta to condemn for an
airport tracts of land which were crossed by several streets devoted
to public use, all located within the city limits of Atlanta's suburban
municipality, College Park. It is interesting to note that the Howard
case arose at a time when commercial aviation was coming into its
own. With the increased demand for better transportation and com-
munication, city airports were completing the transition from private
to public use4° and had been recognized as a public function by the
Georgia legislature.41 The court weighed the relative merits of the two
public uses-airport versus public roads2-and concluded that munici-
palities were empowered, in the absence of a showing of bad faith or
a want of reasonable necessity, to condemn private property and
property devoted to public use within another city.43
The result of Howard v. City of Atlanta is desirable, it is sug-
gested, because it places the focal point of extraterritorial acquisition
cases where it should be-upon the total impact on the region of the
37. Id. at 175-76, 30 N.E. at 611.
38. 251 Ill. 265, 96 N.E. 238 (1911). See text at note 31 supra.
39. 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940).
40. See note 84 infra and accompanying text.
41. Uniform Airport Act, GA. CoDE §§ 11-201 to -203 (1933).
42. For a general discussion of the problem of establishing airports in the area sur-
rounding the municipality see PNsmNr's ARooRT CoMMISsioN, THE AmPoRT AND ITS
N=cinos (1952).
43. 190 Ga. at 736, 10 S.E.2d at 194 (1940).
44. Supra note 39.
1964]
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changed use.45 If the end result will clearly produce a positive good
to the region the acquisition should be permitted; otherwise, it should
be disallowed. Although it appears that the courts are left without
guidelines, such is not the case. The burden should be placed upon
the condemnor to demonstrate first that the social utility of the pro-
posed use outweighs the value of the existing use and second that
the property in issue is the only suitable location.46
B. State Property
Municipal acquisitions from other state governmental units account
for the great majority of all extraterritorial conflicts. There are times,
however, when a municipality will attempt to take property directly
from the state wherein it is located and in fewer instances from an-
other state or even from the federal government. Because of the
infrequency of these types of extraterritorial conflict, there has been
less litigation and thus less articulation of the policies involved.47
Nonetheless, the present trend of the law as it can be interpreted
from the few existing cases appears no less misdirected than in the
conflicts between state governmental units.
In the case of property belonging to the incorporating state (and
also in the cases of out-of-state and federal property, which will be
discussed in the next subsection), the distinction between private and
public property cannot be made so easily as it was with respect to
acquisitions in counties and other municipalities. There is a presump-
tion that all state-owned property is held for a public purpose, making
the private-public distinction inapplicable. From this presumption has
followed the general rule that a municipality cannot condemn or ac-
quire state property unless the power is expressly granted or is mani-
fest through necessary implication.48 There has, however, been an
exception when state-owned land is not presently being used for a
governmental purpose.49 The exception is based upon a bootstrap dis-
45. For further discussion see text at note 162 infra.
46. In Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 46 N.J. Super. 152, 134
A.2d 345 (Ch. 1957), aff'd, 26 N.J. 578, 141 A.2d 308 (1958), a suit against the village
to require the removal of a water tank structure, the court held that where the village
gave no consideration to alternative methods of providing the facilities, the construction
of a water tank was arbitrary and unlawful.
47. It is to be noted that in this situation and in the case of acquisition of out-of-state
or federal property (see note 60 infra) the extraterritorial factor has less significance
than in acquisitions made between state governmental units.
48. See Atlanta v. Central R.R., 53 Ga. 120 (1873), which held that property pur-
chased by the state of Georgia for the purpose of the erection of car-shops for the
operation of the Western and Atlantic Railroad could not be taken without express
authority of the state. See also City of St. Louis v. Moore, 269 Mo. 430, 190 S.W. 867
(1916); In re City of Utica, 73 Hun 256, 26 N.Y. Supp. 564 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
49. See Washington County v. Board of Mississippi Levee Comm'rs, 171 Miss. 80, 156
So. 872 (1934), where the court noted that the state legislature can statutorily author-
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tinction made between property held in a proprietary capacity, as an
individual of the state would hold property, and property held in a
governmental capacity, in trust for the public.5 This distinction is
similar to the type of response courts make when conflicts arise from
city acquisition in other governmental subdivisions.51 In like manner,
greater permissibility is allowed when the property is held in a pro-
prietary manner rather than for a public purpose.52
With the same rationale courts have extended this distinction so
that if authority to appropriate state property is not expressly given,
it may be found to arise by necessary implication if the state-owned
property is held in a proprietary capacity.53 The Supreme Court of
Washington so held in Roberts v. City of Seattle.5 The problem arose
over the attempt of the city of Seattle to condemn a strip of property
for widening a city street which was located within the city but on
the premises of the state university. The court allowed the condemna-
tion even though authority was not expressly granted. The basis of
its decision was the pressing need of the city and the minimal effect
the acquisition would have upon the university. In effect the court
was saying that the thirty-foot strip of university property was held
in a proprietary capacity and therefore could be taken. 5
The courts have continued to modify the strict requirement of ex-
press statutory authorization for acquiring state-owned property. Ex-
emplary is the Supreme Court of Washington, which in City of Seattle
v. States allowed a condemnation action instituted by the city to ac-
quire for use in connection with a proposed river reservoir two tracts
of land situated outside the city limits which were being used for a
state school and capitol building. The court, upholding the city's pro-
ceeding despite a lack of specific statutory authority, found that the
power arose by necessary implication. In still a further extension, the
United States Supreme Court in City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of
Tacoma57 permitted the city to condemn the site of a proposed state
fish hatchery when the land was needed by the city for a dam project,
even though the State of Washington opposed the condemnation and
ize a municipal corporation to take for a different use state property devoted to public
use. Where expressly authorized condemnation has been allowed even though the
property condemned was declared inalienable by state statute. Pacific Power Co. v.
State, 32 Cal. App. 175, 162 Pac. 643 (1917).
50. See State v. Superior Court, 91 Wash. 454, 157 Pac. 1097 (1916), which dis-
cusses the nature of this distinction.
51. See p. 350 supra.
52. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
53. 1 Nrcnors § 2.23.
54. 63 Wash. 573, 116 Pac. 25 (1911).
55. Id. at 26.
56. 54 Wash. 2d 139, 338 P.2d 126 (1959).
57. 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
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the city was otherwise without authority to condemn state-owned
property. The justification for the authority came from a license issued
to the city by the Federal Power Commission under the Federal Power
Act, authorizing the city to build a dam and power plant on a naviga-
ble interstate river.-
Thus it can be seen that the limitations upon the acquisition of
state-owned property are being relaxed. This change is desirable.
Unfortunate, however, is the tendency to justify this greater permis-
siveness on a private-public rationale similar to that used in the case of
municipal acquisitions of land belonging to a county or another munici-
pality. For the reasons stated earlier,59 this attempt at structural
rationality will inevitably lead to an imbroglio if the case law con-
tinues to develop along the lines now established.
C. Out-of-State and Federal Property
In the last two situations, city acquisition of property lying in an-
other state6° or belonging to the federal government,61 no general
power to acquire by condemnation exists. In the case of property
located in another state, any general power of the city must come
from the state of its incorporation, and since it is generally accepted
that the state itself cannot acquire property in another state except
in a proprietary capacity,62 the city, being a creation of the state,
would logically have no greater power. In Pine v. Mayor of City of
New York,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit articulated these limitations in holding that the New York legisla-
ture, in a dispute over riparian rights, could not authorize one of its
municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain in the state
of Connecticut. Thus, it is recognized that a municipal corporation
cannot be given power by its incorporating state to take property by
eminent domain in another state.64 The only means of acquisition
available is by consent of the second state. No such consent has been
found in any case of an out-of-state acquisition.
The acquisition of federal property by a municipality is similarly
limited. In United States v. City of Chicago,65 the federal government
58. Id. at 323.
59. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
60. See generally 1 NIcHOLS § 2.12.
61. See generally 1 Niciaos § 2.22.
62. See discussion of state power to acquire property in another state at note 106
infra.
63. 112 Fed. 98 (2d Cir. 1901), ret'd on other grounds sub. nom. New York City
v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93 (1902).
64. See, e.g., Saunders v. Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co., 58 Fed. 133 (C.C.W.D.
Va. 1893); Illinois State Trust Co. v. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry., 208 Ill. 419, 70 N.E. 357
(1904).
65. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 185 (1849).
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sued to enjoin the city of Chicago from running a street through a
military post under the control and operation of the War Department.
The Supreme Court held that the city had no right to open streets
through property belonging to the United States. In a later case, Utah
Power & Light Co. v. United States, 6 involving a problem of state-
federal conflict in a national park, the court characterized the nature
of federal property as follows:
The public lands of the United States are held by it, not as an ordinary
individual proprietor, but in trust for all the people of all the states to pay
debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare under the
'express terms of the Constitution itself. It matters not whether the title is
acquired by cession from other states, or by treaty with a foreign country,
whether the lands are located within states or in territories, they are held
for these supreme public uses when and as they may arise. The Congress
has the exclusive right to control and dispose of them, and no state can
interfere with this right or embarrass its exercise.
67
It is seen, therefore, that in both the cases of city acquisitions in a
state other than that of its incorporation and acquisition of federally
owned property, municipalities can derive no power of eminent do-
main from the state. It has been held, however, that by specific grant
from the federal government either acquisition can be made. In
Haeussler v. City of St. Louis, 9 an action in equity to keep the city
of St. Louis from issuing bonds for the construction of a municipal
bridge across the Mississippi River, the court stated:
[T]he city of St. Louis, a corporation, has the charter and legal authority to
construct this bridge in so far as the state of Missouri and its laws are
concerned. It has the specific grant from the federal government, giving it
the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, not only in Missouri, but
in Illinois.7 0
In a similar problem which arose over the attempted condemnation
of property in Kentucky by a West Virginia municipality, the court
observed: "The United States, being a sovereign, also enjoys the right
of eminent domain. Under the commerce clause of the Federal Con-
stitution, Article 1, § 8, the United States might condemn the bridge
in question, or may delegate such right to West Virginia and Ken-
66. 230 Fed. 328 (8th Cir. 1915). This was a suit by the federal government to
enjoin the Utah Power & Light Company from maintaining possession and occupancy
of federal lands forming part of the Cache National Forest. The utility company had
acquired by condemnation property in the forest upon which they operated a hydro-
electric power works. The court held the possession unlawful and the United States
land not subject to condemnation under a power derived from the state.
67. Id. at 336.
68. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
69. 205 Mo. 656, 103 S.W. 1034 (1907).
70. Id. at 1042.
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tucky, or to either of them."71 From this it follows that if the federal
government specifically grants the power to a state municipality it
can condemn federally owned or controlled property in either the
state of its incorporation or another state.72
From the present state of the law the difficulty with the acquisition
of both out-of-state and federal property can be focused on the per-
mission from the condemnee required before the property can be
taken. Such permission is seldom given, if ever. Thus, acquisition of
such land needed by a municipality for parks, water supply, or even
bridges and ferries is virtually foreclosed. As a result any systematic
and logical extension of municipal activities is stymied because of our
antiquated legal concepts which do not recognize the possibility of
a superior, more urgent need of a municipality when it crosses the
sacred lines of another state or federal property for the acquisition
of property.
II. ACQUISIMONS IN THE MuNicrPALrrY
A. By the County
The county, viewed from a political and legal aspect, is a subdivi-
sion of the territory of a state,73 created as a governmental agency of
the state to aid in the administration of governmental affairs and to
exercise all powers of government which are delegated to it.74 It is a
unit of the central and local government and like the municipality
has no powers except those derived from the statutes of the state.
Unlike the municipality and its predecessor, the English shire, which
was drawn to conform to natural boundaries,7 5 the county is an
artificial, deliberately laid out division. Counties, nevertheless, are
often compared to municipalities because they have some of the
general characteristics of municipal corporations." As the court noted
71. County Court v. Louisa & Fort Gay Bridge Co., 46 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.W. Va.
1942). See also Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, supra note 66, at 339.
72. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
73. See 1 McQuImLLI § 1.88. But cf. Bacus v. Lake County, 138 Mont. 69, 354 P.2d
1056 (1960), which suggests that counties cannot be classified as political subdivisions
of a state.
74. According to County of Bergen v. Port of New York Authority, 32 N.J. 303, 160
A.2d 811 (1960), the county, historically, was solely a subdivision of the state con-
stituted to administer state power and authority and was created without regard to local
wishes and solely to serve as a body politic.
75. See WirsoN, Tn STATE § 1026 (rev. ed. 1907).
76. McQuillin states: "[Ilt is generally held that, although counties have the general
characteristics of municipal corporations, they are not considered such unless made so
by constitution or statute and, therefore, fall into the class of bodies politic, called
quasi-public or quasi-municipal corporations organized to aid in the proper administra-
tion of state affairs with such powers and functions as the law prescribes." 1 McQUILLIN
§ 2.46, at 497.
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in Vance S. Harrington & Co. v. Renner, 77 a suit to restrain a violation
of the zoning ordinance:
[T]hough counties are bodies politic and corporate, created by the State
for certain public purposes, they are not in strict legal sense municipal
corporations -as are cities and towns, but are rather instrumentalities of the
State by means of which the State performs governmental functions within
its territorial limits.
78
Another distinguishing characteristic from municipal corporations
is the fact that counties are created without the consent of the in-
habitants whereas the municipal corporation depends upon the ap-
proval of its constituents for existence.79 A more fundamental and
critical difference between the two, however, is that the county often
represents the suburban interests, which frequently appear intrinsically
in conflict with the interests of the central cityYs Despite these differ-
ences the source and nature of the county's power to acquire property
in another governmental unit are nearly the same as in the case of
the municipality, and the considerations relevant to limitations on the
power of the municipality to act apply to the county. Thus, when a
county attempts to take property located within a city, problems of
express and implied power, the present use of the property, and con-
flicting zoning ordinances will arise. However, since counties are by
nature less active than municipalities,81 there has been less litigation
of conflicts arising when it was the condemnor. For this reason the
problem cannot be examined in as structured a manner as with city
acquisitions.82
77. 236 N.C. 321, 72 S.E.2d 838 (1952).
78. Id. at 841.
79. See State ex rel. McQueen v. Brandon, 244 Ala. 62, 12 So. 2d 319 (1943), where
the court observed that a county is an involuntary association created as an arm of the
state whereas a city is a voluntary association created by the will of its inhabitants.
80. Robert C. Wood, an M.I.T. political scientist, commented as follows on the
government of suburbia: "To political science, suburban government, strictly speaking,
is neither different from other governments in the United States nor new at all. Govern-
ments in suburbia have the same names, the same powers, the same political and ad-
ministrative processes as do local governments in urban and rural areas. There are
counties, cities, towns, townships, boroughs, special districts, and authorities, creatures
of the state, operating by law or under charters authorized by the state. These names,
these powers, these authorizations are traditional: they were established long before
suburbia, as we know it today, ever existed. There is a political map on which suburban
boundaries appear and across which the name SUBURBIA in bold black letters is in-
scribed." Wood, The Governing of Suburbia, in ThE SunuRBAN CoMMUNrrY 165 (Do-
bringer ed. 1958). For further treatment of the suburban problem, see CAnsvm, Crrxs
m =z Suunus (1962).
81. There are several reasons why the county is less active than the central city. One
reason is its more amorphous character, another its greater difficulty in identifying goals,
and a third the smaller number of demands on county government than on the more
concentrated city government.
82. For a discussion of the likely role of counties in the foreseeable future see three
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The general limitations on a municipal corporation-that it have ex-
press power to condemn property outside the municipal boundaries
and that the property in question not be dedicated or in use for a
public purpose-apply to the county when it attempts to acquire
property in a municipality. 83 Where some types of express power can
be found, or where it arises by necessary implication, a county will
be permitted to acquire vacant land owned by a municipality. So
the court held in Bergen County Sewer Authority v. Borough of Little
Ferry,8 4 a condemnation proceeding for a sewer in a corporate mu-
nicipality. However, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, in apparent dis-
regard of the basic limitations on extraterritorial acquisitions, rejected
in Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Commissioners,
85
a petition for injunction against Cuyahoga County from condemning
municipal property for an airport. The village could not show that
the construction of a village hall was more necessary and reasonable
than the county's airport. The court balanced the relative merits and
conveniences of the parties and permitted a partial acquisition even
though the municipality had recently acquired the land for municipal
buildings and recreational purposes.86 In this case the property in
question was dedicated but not yet being used for a public purpose,
which may be the court's best justification for its action. In Village
of Amityville v. Suffolk Count y,8 however, the court allowed a county
to condemn a strip of land for a highway through property already
devoted and presently being used for a public purpose. Although the
court attempted to justify its action by labeling the two uses con-
sistent,88 the real reason for its decision appears to be that the county,
relying on the village's former resolution that it would support the
project, had expended a quarter of a million dollars on the project
and the town appeared only to be seeking a higher price for the
property.89
In both of these cases, the court made a belated effort to reconcile
its decision with precedent. It succeeded no better than other courts
have with respect to city acquisition.90 Nevertheless, the results are
separate comments by Hillenbrand, Briley, and Bossert, entitled Counties in the Metro-
politan Future, in A~miaucA Socm=r OF PLANNING OFFCIALS, PLANNING 1961 30
(1961).
83. Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Comm'rs, 112 Ohio App, 272,
166 N.E.2d 143 (1960).
84. 7 N.J. Super. 213, 72 A.2d 886 (1950).
85. Supra note 83.
86. Id. at 146. See also State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 83 Ohio
App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694 (1948), appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d 911.
87. 132 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
88. See also In the Matter of Rochester Water Comm'rs, 66 N.Y. 413 (1876).
89. See Village of Amityville v. Suffolk County, supra note 87, at 846.
90. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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desirable and the considerations relevant to the city conflict are ap-
plicable here."
B. By the State
When the American colonies separated from Great Britain each
assumed control over the people and property within its territorial
jurisdiction.92 With this assumption of power went the general power
of eminent domain, a power which each new state likewise inherited,
a power which is in fact an inherent attribute of sovereignty-one "of
which the sovereign cannot divest itself."93 It is only logical that a
power so absolute would extend to the taking of property from a cor-
porate municipality, it being but a creature of the state. And so it
does. The only limit which seems to be placed upon the state is that
if it takes property which is essentially "private," just compensation
must be made. Thus, in Village of Canajoharie v. New York94 the
court required the state to give just compensation for a baseball field
it had appropriated because the field was held in a "proprietary"
rather than a "governmental" capacity. 5 In the case of property held
by a municipal corporation for a public purpose, however, the state
apparently can take at will. Illustrative is the case of People v. Kerr.6
The controversy here concerned land which had originally been con-
demned for public streets by the city of New York pursuant to state
statute. Subsequent to this condemnation, the state legislature author-
ized condemnation of this city property for the construction of a rail-
road. The city then sought an injunction on the theory that the second
statute permitted the taking of the city's private property without
compensation. In absolute terms the court, per Wright, J., refused
to grant the injunction, holding that all property acquired by a mu-
nicipality by the power of eminent domain, being held in public trust
for the people, is subject to the absolute control of the legislature,
and no appropriation of it to a public use is a taking of private prop-
erty which requires compensation.
97
The Kerr case has stood for the proposition that property acquired
by a municipality by virtue of the power of eminent domain is subject
91. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
92. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517 (1819).
93. 11 McQUU.mimN, § 32.11, at 268-69.
94. 13 Misc. 2d 293, 177 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
95. For a discussion of when compensation should and should not be given see Parr,
State Condemnation of Municipally-Owned Property: The Governmental-Proprietary
Distinction, 11 SYRACUSE L. Ray. 27 (1959).
96. 27 N.Y. 188 (1863).
97. Id. at 213. See also City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R., 24 Iowa 455
(1868), which held that property acquired pursuant to a town's power of eminent
domain is subject to unrestrained control by the state.
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to the unrestrained control of the stateP8 This control is not limited,
however, to property acquired by eminent domain but extends to all
property held by a municipality regardless of how acquired. For ex-
ample, in Welch v. City & County of Denver99 the court held there
was no limitation on the state's right to seize property, in this case a
city park, despite a provision in the city charter which prohibited any
change from the present use of the property as a park. A similar result
was reached in Massachusetts when the state condemned the sub-
surface of the Boston Common, 100 and by a Florida court which per-
mitted the state flood control agency to acquire city land presently
being used for a garbage dumping ground.1' 1 Nevertheless, limits
have been placed upon the power of state agencies to acquire prop-
erty10 2 to be used for such purposes as hospitals, sanitariums, or jails
where there are zoning ordinances which restrict such uses.103 This
type of restriction is likely to continue in an accelerated trend in
zoning ordinances, as communities attempt to ban so-called undesira-
ble activities.Y14 There appears, however, little justification for a re-
striction of this type which acknowledges the public need of the
institution but asks that it be located elsewhere. The type of judicial
response which appears preferable is that of an Ohio court which
held that a zoning restriction had no effect upon the state's power to
acquire city property zoned against a proposed state turnpike when
the state's need was greater than that of the municipality.105
C. By Another State
One more dimension of state appropriation of city property needs
to be noted. This involves the appropriation of city property in an-
other state. Although the problem can be viewed in terms of appro-
priating out-of-state city property, it is actually the taking of another
state's property, the municipality being but a part of the state. Viewed
in either respect, the issue is the same and the power of the state
98. Parr, supra note 95, at 29.
99. 141 Colo. 587, 349 P.2d 352 (1960).
100. Appleton v. Massachusetts Parking Authority, 340 Mass. 303, 164 N.E.2d 137
(1960).
101. City of Dania v. Central & So. Fla. Food Control Dist., 134 So. 2d 848 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1961).
102. For a discussion of the problems arising in the delegation of the power to con-
demn property in the name of the state see 1 NicnoLs § 3.222, at 250.
103. For a discussion of the type of considerations which need to be made when
zoning ordinances conflict with a public use see Note, Zoning Against the Public WVel-
fare, 71 YALE LJ. 720 (1962).
104. See Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. Rnv.
515, 524 (1957).
105. State ex rel., Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345
(1952), cert. denied sub nom. Balduff v. Turnpike Comm'n, 344 U.S. 865 (1952).
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is totally limited: "any attempt to exercise governmental powers in
another state [is] ... necessarily void."16 In the words of the court
in County Court v. Louisa & Fort Gay Bridge Go.,107 a proceeding
by the county to condemn a privately owned toll bridge partly in
West Virginia and partly in Kentucky,
the power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty. Within its own
jurisdiction each state possesses such sovereign power. But no state can
take or authorize the taking of property located in another state. Each
state holds all the property within its territorial limits free from the eminent
domain of all other states.108
It is seen, therefore, that a state can in practically no situation take
property of another state. Under these legal restrictions the only
problems of extraterritorial conflict which may arise are over the con-
demnation of interstate bridges 109 or common waterways 110 or possibly
the constructive taking of property by the infliction of injury on the
other state's property."' As a result there has been little litigation in
this area of interstate acquisitions. In fact, no case has been found
where one state took property from another against the latter's will.
Thus, the only means of acquisition is by consent; this fact often
presents impossible situations for land planners when problems of an
interstate character arise.
D. By the Federal Government
Like the state and unlike the municipal corporation, the federal
government possesses the power of eminent domain as a sovereign
rather than as a receiver of derivative powers." 2 Thus, the limitation
on a municipality against acquiring property already dedicated to a
public use for another and inconsistent public purpose is not imposed
on the federal government. For example, in United States v. Carmack"
3
the Supreme Court reversed the two lower courts and upheld the
power of the Federal Works Administrator to condemn municipal
property which was being used or was to be used for a local park,
courthouse, city hall, and public library. The Court, in upholding the
106. 1 NICHOLS § 2.12, at 115.
107. 46 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.W. Va. 1942).
108. Id. at 2. State of Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924); Florida
State Hosp. v. Durham Iron Co., 68 Ga. App. 6, 21 S.E.2d 216 (1942).
109. Evansville & H. Traction Co. v. Henderson Bridge Co., 134 Fed. 973 (W.D. Ky.
1904).
110. See 2 NicHOLs § 5.795 for a discussion of the riparian rights of a municipality.
111. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
112. 1 NICHOLS § 2.131[3], at 125.
113. 329 U.S. 230 (1946). See also United States v. Jotham Bixby Co., 55 F.2d 317
(S.D. Cal. 1932), which permitted the federal government to condemn park property
for a post office and custom house.
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acquisition for a post office and custom house, quoted from the classic
decision in Kohl" 4 which rejected the requirement of a state court
proceeding for a federal condemnation. It said:
If the United States has the power, it must be complete in itself. It can
neither be enlarged nor diminished by a State. Nor can any State prescribe
the manner in which it must be exercised. The consent of a State can never
be a condition precedent to its enjoyment."15
Under its power of eminent domain the federal government has
acquired property for such diverse purposes as national monuments,
civil defense facilities, national parks, interstate bridges, watershed
and flood protection, and interstate highways. This power is usually
exercised pursuant to statutory authorization. For example in the
acquisition of lands for the Antietam battlefield site the Congress gave
the Secretary of the Interior the power to acquire by donation, pur-
chase, or condemnation property that would be of historical interest
for this national park.116 A more familiar aspect of federal acquisition
is that of the interstate highway program. The Interstate Highway
Act of 1956"1 and the supplemental act of 1958 were revolutionary
in programming a national system of modem highways." 8 This act
has provided the means whereby property could be acquired not only
for roads but also for bridges, tunnels, and areas adjacent to the in-
terstate system.119 So great has been its impact that it is presently
felt in every state.
It is also significant to note that the rationale for federal eminent
domain proceedings has created situations of unjust condemnations.
It is assumed in federal acquisitions that property acquired is for the
benefit of the people of all the states and the nation as a whole.
Therefore the use inures to the benefit of everyone including citizens
of the state where the condemned property is situated, despite the
fact they may protest the taking.120 From this it follows that the
governmental-proprietary distinction is not relevant since the federal
government can condemn all properties 12 1 unless the federal power
114. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
115. 329 U.S. at 238; 91 U.S. at 374 (1875).
116. Act of May 14, 1940, ch. 191, 54 Stat. 212.
117. 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1959).
118. See generally Interstate Highway Symposium, 38 NEB. L. lREv. 373 (1959).
119. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1959).
120. Grover Irr. & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir and Irr. Co., 21 Wyo. 204,
131 Pac. 43 (1913).
121. All property held by a municipal corporation is deemed "private" within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. Therefore, compensation must be made. See United
States v. Wheeler Township, 66 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1933); Town of Bedford v. United
States, 23 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1927).
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has been delegated to a private' 22 or a municipal corporation. 2 3 As
a result the unconditionality of this rule has created an unnecessary
inflexibility. It is apparent that there are times when the cost of a
condemnation to the immediate inhabitants is great and should defeat
the taking regardless of whether the condemnor is the state or the
federal government. 24 To reply that it is always for the benefit of the
inhabitants even though they protest is logic with the force of Jabber-
wocky: "Contrariwise," continued Tweedledee, "if it was so, it might
be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's
logic."125
III. CONsisTENcy FRoM =HE CASES
It would be difficult to suggest that the foregoing discussion demon-
strates any uniformity of approach or response by the courts to the
problem of condemnations in and by the corporate municipality.
Nevertheless, some coherence can be found with respect to conflicts
between cities and other governmental units if the cases are analyzed
from a functional posture rather than according to the nature of the
participant. 126 Approached in this manner four types of controversy
appear to exist. In the first the proposed use is for a governmental
or public purpose and the property is in private hands. The second
is the reverse, where property is presently dedicated or being used for
a public purpose and the city attempting the condemnation is pro-
posing a private or inconsistent use of the property. The third is
where both the proposed taking and present use are proprietary in
character and the fourth where both are public in character.
The inclusion of a particular situation in one of these four categories
depends upon the scope of the labels "public" and "private." The
term public is used here to refer to those activities of a city which
are governmental in nature and involve a function normally performed
by a governmental unit for its inhabitants or constituents. The per-
formance of this type of municipal function can be considered as part
of the attribute of sovereignty delegated by the state to the munici-
122. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890);
Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y.R.R., 32 Fed. 9 (D.N.J. 1887), appeal dismissed, 140 U.S.
699 (1890).
123. See, e.g., Latinette v. St. Louis, 210 Fed. 676 (1912),
124. See note 216 infra and accompanying text.
125. CAnaOL, TmouGH THE LOOKING-GLAss, in THE LEwis CAmaoLL BooK 207
(Herrick ed. 1931).
126. The problems presented when either the state or the federal government is a
party are inherently different. As has been seen, when either of them are parties to a
condemnation proceeding involving a corporate municipality different rules govern.
Thus it has been found necessary to disassociate these types of proceedings from the
inter-city type conflict now under consideration.
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pality.127 In this capacity municipalities construct and maintain
schools, parks, highways, bridges, and sewage disposal facilities. The
term private, on the other hand, refers to the ability of the munici-
pality to conduct business or to provide services in its capacity as a
corporation.1' In this capacity the city may construct utility works
for supplying water and light to its inhabitants or may establish
markets, cemeteries, or libraries for their use.129 By performing in a
proprietary capacity the municipality may claim the rights and im-
munities of a private corporation 130 but it is also subject to a private
corporation's liabilities.
The results normally reached by the courts in each of the four cate-
gories can be predicted with a great deal of regularity. In the first,
where the proposed use is public and the present use private, courts
almost universally permit the taking.131 For example, courts will per-
mit extraterritorial condemnations of private property for parks and
parkways 132 and for municipal water and sewage. 33 In the second
category, a present public use and a projected private need, courts
will disallow the taking.134 The same result is reached in the third,
where both the proposed taking and present use are proprietary in
character.135 The fourth can be predicated with less certainty, but
generally when two public uses conflict the court will uphold the
existing use 136 unless the taking party can demonstrate a critical need
substantially surpassing that of the holding govermnental unit.137
Thus, courts have dealt with extraterritorial condemnation problems
with a great deal more predictability than one would expect from the
preceding examination of these conflicts.
Predictability of response is an often sought objective of our judici-
ary. However, if the response becomes almost automatic once the
127. 1 NicHoLs § 2.225[1, at 177.
128. 1 NicHoLs § 2.23, at 182.
129. 1 NicHoLs § 2.225[1], at 178.
130. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
131. For verification from the survey of conflicts based on the participant see notes
15 (municipality versus governmental unit) and 53 (municipality versus state) supra
and accompanying texts.
132. See, e.g., Memphis v. Hastings, 113 Tenn. 142, 86 S.W. 609 (1904).
133. See, e.g., City of Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N.C. 750, 40 S.E.2d 600 (1946).
134. Since condemnations pursuant to the power of eminent domain must be for a
public use, this situation will seldom arise, and if it does the attempted taking should
be disallowed as outside the power, rather than by employment of the types of consid-
erations suggested here. See 11 McQumim § 32.01, at 256.
135. This type of condemnation also gives little trouble for the same reason as did
category two-it is an illegal use of the power of condemnation.
136. This has been demonstrated in the prior survey. See notes 31 (municipality
versus governmental unit) and 47 (municipality versus state) supra and accompanying
texts.
137. See earlier discussion at notes 39 (municipality versus governmental unit) and
56 (municipality versus state) supra and accompanying texts.
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object of the taking and the present use of the property is known, a
frightening inflexibility is likely which will produce a violation of the
basic land planning goal-the promotion of the most desirable alloca-
tion of land resources." Although not usually articulated as such,
the courts have in effect applied the governmental-proprietary test,139
a test often used in other municipal problems.140 The difficulty with
taking this approach to the extraterritorial problem is twofold. First,
the distinction has inherent problems which make it a questionable
means of solving any municipal problem. Second, the governmental-
proprietary test is totally out of context in the regional area. With
respect to the inherent limitation of the test there are at least four
criticisms that can be made. The first is that the line between govern-
mental and proprietary is difficult, often impossible, to draw, particu-
larly since society's concept of what is private and what is public is
constantly changing.141 At the polar extremes it is not too difficult to
classify public streets and fire prevention as governmental, or markets
as proprietary. But what about public utilities and libraries? Are they
public or private? For making this determination several criteria have
been suggested: the manner in which the municipal corporation ob-
tained the property; whether or not it is an activity generally engaged
in by private persons or corporations; the power of the corporation to
dispose of the property; and the benefit accruing to the municipality,
whether primarily a pecuniary profit or a special corporate benefit to
the citizenry.142 These tests have not only proved to be inadequate
but have also failed to produce uniform results within a state. For
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Reid Development Corp.
v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township143 held that the maintenance and
138. See text at note 14 supra.
139. The governmental-proprietary distinction originated in judicial decisions after
the separation of the colonies from England. The courts drew the distinction "in order
to impose common law liability on municipal corporations for the negligence of their
agents, servants or officers in their execution of corporate power and duties." State
ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960). For general discussion see Davis,
Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. Rnv. 756 (1956); PaossER, TonTs
§ 109 (2d ed. 1955).
140. The governmental-proprietary test began as a gauge of municipal tort liability.
It soon spread, however, to other areas of municipal law until today it has importance
in problems of municipal tax liability, alienation of property, legislative control over
property, execution upon property, and, it is suggested, extraterritorial condemnations.
See Blachly & Oatman, Approaches to Government Liability in Tort: A Comparative
Study, 9 LAw & CoN'mva,. PROB. 181 (1942); Doddridge, Distinction Between Govern-
mental and Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations, 23 Mic. L. IRv. 325
(1925).
141. For example, airports and garbage disposal were generally characterized as
private functions thirty years ago. Today, however, both are usually considered public
activities. See Annot., Municipal Operation of a Sewage Disposal Plant as Governmental
or Proprietary Function, for Purposes of Tort Liability, 57 A.L.R.2d 1136 (1958).
142. Doddridge, supra note 140, at 330-31.
143. 10 N.J. 299, 89 A.2d 667 (1952).
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,operation 6f a water system for protection against fire and other dan-
gers to the public health and safety constituted a governmental func-
tion. However, the classification most often given by New Jersey
courts to the operation of a water system by a municipality for its
inhabitants is proprietary-it is usually considered private activity sub-
ject to the rules governing a private corporation.144
The second difficulty with the governmental-proprietary distinction
is the lack of uniformity among the different states. As a result, a
situation is produced where an activity which is governmental in one
state may be proprietary in another state. As the court properly stated
in Proprietors of Mt. Hope Cemetery v. City of Boston,145 a suit con-
cerning the condemnation of certain cemetery properties in the city
of Boston,
no exact or full enumeration can be made of the kinds of property which
will fall within it, because, in different states, similar kinds of property may
be held under different laws, and with different duties and obligations, so
that a kind of property might in one state be held strictly for public uses,
while in another state it might not be.'4
The conflict between designations among different states is exempli-
fied in takings for water systems. In Baltis v. Village of Westchester,141
a suit to enjoin villages from selling water to another municipality,
the Illinois court noted the "well-established principle" that
A municipal corporation owning and operating a water system and selling
water to individuals, although engaged in a public service, does so in its
business or proprietary capacity, not in any governmental capacity, and no
distinction is to be drawn between such business whether engaged in by
a municipality or by a private corporation. 148
Despite this well-established principle, it is recalled that the New
Jersey court in the Parsippany-Troy Hills'49 case concluded that the
operation of water systems was a governmental function.5 0
144. There is general agreement that the distribution of water by a municipality to
its inhabitants for domestic and commercial uses is a private or proprietary activity or
service subject to rules of a private corporation. See Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Jersey City,
103 N.J.L. 574, 138 Ad. 467 (1927).
145. 158 Mass. 509, 33 N.E. 695 (1893).
146. Ibid. The fact that the issue here was whether compensation was to be paid
or not for an eminent domain taking may be critical. If the city bad been appropriating
property for a cemetery, and compensation was not in issue, the court might well havo
labeled the condemnation one for a public purpose.
147. 3 Ill. App. 2d 388, 121 N.E.2d 495 (1954).
148. Id. at 500.
149. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, Morris County v. Bowman, 3 N.J. 97, 69
A.2d 199 (1949).
150. But see Iowa and Massachusetts decisions holding water systems proprietary.
Miller Grocery Co. v. City of Des Moines, 195 Iowa 1310, 192 N.W. 306 (1923);
Lyons v. City of Lowell, 239 Mass. 310, 131 N.E. 860 (1921).
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A third problem found in attempting to employ a governmental-
proprietary distinction is that of concurrent functions. 15' For example,
a city might condemn extraterritorial property to build and operate a
-plant for both a municipal power system (governmental) and for a
general power supply (private); or perhaps property is used to in-
corporate the objectives of a source for water supply (private) and
a sewage or garbage disposal plant (governmental).152 Thus, govern-
mental and proprietary functions overlap and make any type of dis-
tinction on this basis difficult.
Augmenting this problem of commingled functions is a fourth com-
plexity arising out of the other areas of municipal law where the
public-private distinction is made. This problem exists because the
dual nature of municipal corporations-governmental and proprietary
-is recognized in other branches of law, notably in tort liability and
property alienation.5 3 When a similar distinction is attempted for
each body of law, the precise delineation is often extremely difficult
to make.'- 4 The result is that the same function can be considered
governmental for some purposes and private for others-even in the
same state. For example, in Indiana a municipal corporation main-
tains and controls a fire department in a proprietary capacity for con-
demnation purposes, which classification prohibits the state from ap-
propriating the property without paying full compensation.55 In the
field of tort liability, however, fire departments have been held gov-
ernmental in nature, thereby allowing cities to escape liability for the
negligence of their acts in this capacity.
5 6
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the governmental-
proprietary distinction has serious inherent limitations which make
it at best a questionable basis for resolution of not only extraterritorial
conflicts but also conflicts in any municipal field. In addition to these
intrinsic limitations, it lacks relevance in the extraterritorial acquisi-
tion context. The policy reasons which first suggested the distinction-
a limitation of the ancient concept of governmental immunity from
liability for personal injuries inflicted by governmental agencies-and
the subsequent development of it appear to have little validity or ap-
plication in resolving conflicts between governmental units over extra-
territorial condemnations. One reason for this lack of relevance is that
the governmental-proprietary distinction does not apply when the con-
151. MADDox, ExTnA EuuuonoIwA PowvERs oF MuNxrciArr=s INr TH UNTrED STATES
2(1955).
152. See Doddridge, supra note 140, at 336.
153. For the historical development of the governmental-proprietary function see note
140 supra.
154. 1 NIcHoLS § 2.225[1l].
155. State v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N.E. 19 (1902).
156. See Robinson v. City of Evansville, 87 Ind. 334 (1882).
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flict involves either the state or the federal government." 7 In the case
of the state the governmental-proprietary test is important but only
on the issue of compensation; the acquisition is always permitted.5 8
With respect to the federal government all property taken is consid-
ered private and compensation is likewise always awarded.159 In the
reverse situation of the municipality attempting to acquire state or
federal property the present law is just as rigid and a governmental-
proprietary distinction is never made. The result is that the distinction
is used for some types of extraterritorial acquisitions but not for others.
Another reason why the governmental-proprietary distinction lacks
relevance is because it is illusory in the extraterritorial context. In
some cases it changes the character of a municipality's activity solely
because the activity extends beyond its corporate limits. To make this
factor outcome-determinative is unrealistic and makes "'a fetish out of
invisible municipal boundary lines ... .'"160 For these reasons and
the ones given earlier it is suggested that the only significance the
distinction should have is with respect to the authority of the munici-
pality to act. Thus, whenever the municipality acts pursuant to power
either explicitly or impliedly given, it functions as a government and
not as a private corporation. However, to characterize the action in
this manner would not solve the majority of conflicts over extraterri-
torial acquisitions. Furthermore, it would necessitate a different focal
point for decision. As suggested in the municipal acquisition sec-
tion,161 instead of the governmental-proprietary distinction, the cri-
terion should be the total impact upon the region-the total impact
of the change from the present use to the new use.
To recommend that the courts should consider the total impact
upon the region suggests a role for the courts as land planning bodies.
This is a function that has already, in part, been forced upon the
courts when conflicts over extraterritorial acquisitions arise. A recent
case, City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court,16 a typical inter-city
conflict, is illustrative. The city of Scottsdale sought an injunction
against the Municipal Court of Tempe to prevent the enforcement of
a zoning ordinance and building code against property upon which
Scottsdale planned to erect and maintain a municipal sewage disposal
plant. The court, taking judicial notice of the fact that the Scottsdale
area had experienced a population boom requiring the expansion of
157. However the governmental-proprietary test has been used to determine whether
or not a state could take federally owned property. 1 Nicisors § 222[3].
158. Id. § 2.225[1].
159. Id. § 2.212. See also note 121 supra.
160. Schwartz v. Congregation Powslei Zeduck, 8 Ill. App. 2d 438, 441, 131 N.E.2d
785, 786 (1956).
161. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
162. 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962).
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their sewage disposal facilities and that the land in question was gen-
erally known to be of marginal residential value (marshy area),163
granted the injunction. To the extent that the court took judicial
notice of the surrounding conditions and the impact this land use
would have on the area, it was acting not as a court but as a land
planning body."
The court in the Scottsdale case acted upon its own initiative and
took judicial notice of the nature of the property in issue and the sur-
rounding property conditions. 65 This is not unusual since many courts
adjudicating inter-city acquisitions have found it necessary to function
in this manner. In Ohio one court thought itself forced to assume
such a position in order to give effect to the Ohio constitution, which
gives municipalities overlapping power of eminent domain. Article
seventeen, section four provides that "any municipality may acquire,
construct, own, lease and operate within or without its corporate
limits, any public utility ... ." In Village of Blue Ash v. City of
Cincinnati,166 the court said, in denying an injunction which would
have prohibited the city from proceeding with the appropriation of
part of a village street:
[W]hen there is a conflict of sovereignty between two municipalities in
Ohio, such as we have here . . . we must look to the results which will
follow and decide which course of conduct will contribute to the greater
good of the community as a whole.
167
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that
The limits to which the court's power may extend are not governed by
principles of equity, thereby giving power to a court to base its judgment
upon a paramount public need in a contest between two sovereign govern-
ments, each possessing the power of eminent domain. The limit of the
163. For discussion of the type of land see id. at 395-96, 368 P.2d at 638.
164. See Duffson Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347
(1949), which sustained the exclusion of all heavy industry from the local corporate
bounds. The New Jersey court took notice of the fact that there was extensive land
within the region, although outside the particular municipal corporate area, which was
available for industrial use.
165. 90 Ariz. 393, 395-96, 368 P.2d 637, 638 (1962).
166. 173 N.E.2d 400 (1960), ret'd, 173 Ohio St. 345, 182 N.E.2d 557 (1962).
167. Id. at 401-02. The court in full recognition of the role it was playing stated:
"It seems to this Court that in appropriating the street in question, we must take into
consideration, not only the detriment, if any, to the Village, but also the benefit to the
community at large, as well as the waste of money that might result. Will the sacrifice
of part of the use of Plainfield Road as a public highway, for the construction and
operation of the City's Airport contribute more to the general welfare of the entire
community? This is an equity proceeding. The Chancellor in equity can control the
activity of both municipalities; he can insist that both sides be reasonable; he can
make the City supply a new location of Plainfield Road, if necessary, in order to pro-
vide the equivalent of the former service of Plainfield Road; he can compel the con-
struction of more than one road." Id. at 401.
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court's power is to enjoin an unlawful or improper exercise of the power of
eminent domain beyond the limits of a constitutional or statutory grant
.... 168
A similar case, though involving a city and county, was Village of
Richmond Heights v. Board of County Commissioners.69 This was a
suit to enjoin a county condemnation for an airport of property re-
cently acquired by the plaintiff village for municipal buildings and
recreational purposes. The court found that the municipality and the
county had equal rights conferred by state statute to appropriate the
land for the purposes anticipated and consequently found it necessary.
to "balance the relative conveniences of the parties .. . ."10 In so
doing they granted the injunction to that extent that the village could
demonstrate a reasonable need for the property in question for its
municipal buildings but denied it with respect to that portion of the
property where the county's need was greater.
In both of these cases, Blue Ash (lower- court opinion) and Rich-
mond Heights, the court was caught in the dilemma of attempting to
enforce state statutes which gave both parties the power to acquire the
property, and in order to adjudicate the dispute it was necessary to
weigh all the factors involved for the future use of the land. To this
extent the court was performing a land planning function.
Assuming, then, that courts resolving inter-city conflicts often find
it necessary to consider the impact on the region in order to make a
proper adjudication, a question must be raised as to whether the
courts can or should legitimately function in this capacity. An answer
to this question is suggested in the related field of zoning, a land-use
control which is probably the most widely adopted land planning
device. 1"' It can generally be said that when zoning ordinances have
been adopted, courts generally have the power to "grant relief in ap-
propriate proceedings against zoning where it is unreasonable, dis-
criminatory, unconstitutional or otherwise invalid."1 2 This power
includes inquiry into the classification of properties and even into
whether the basis of the classification is impartially applied.73 There
are, however, definite limitations on the extent to which any court can
act when dealing with municipal zoning. For example, it cannot in-
terfere in the application of the zoning ordinance, assuming it is con-
stitutional, unless the ordinance clearly exceeds the power under
168. Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 353, 182 N.E.2d
557, 563 (1962).
169. 112 Ohio App. 272, 166 N.E.2d 143 (1960).
170. Id. at 283, 166 N.E.2d at 151.
171. HAR , LAND-UsE PLANNwNG 147 (1959).
172. 8 McQumiiN § 25.277, at 675-76.
173. Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949).
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which it was enacted. 174 A fortiori it cannot substitute its judgment
for that of the legislative body or zoning commission which adopted
the ordinance. For example, in Robinson v. City of Bloomfield Hills'75
a suit for mandamus to construct an office building on property zoned
for residential purposes, the court stated in upholding the zoning
ordinance:
[Tihis Court .does not sit as a super-zoning commission. Our laws have
wisely committed to the people of a community themselves the determina-
tion of their municipal destiny, the dekr'ee to which the industrial may have
precedence over the residential, and the areas carved out of each to be
devoted to commercial pursuits. With the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the
determination we are not concerned. The people of the community, through
their appropriate legislative body, and not the courts, govern its growth and
its life.1
7 6
Furthermore, a court cannot require the legislative body or zoning
commission to enact or amend a zoning ordinance. Illustrative is a
recent California case, Banville v. County of Los Angeles.17 7 Involved
was a dispute which arose from the refusal of the county board of
supervisors to enact a zoning ordinance as the plaintiff desired. In
refusing relief the court stated:
Under our law the legislative body cannot be forced to enact or amend a
zoning ordinance. The courts can declare an action of the Legislature
unconstitutional where such action exceeds the limits of the Constitution,
but the courts have no means and no power to avoid the effects of new
action. "rhe Legislature being the creative element in the system, its action
cannot be quickened by other departments.",78
From this examination it is seen that a court cannot lawfully per-
form the function of a super zoning board. Yet the types of considera-
tions and determinations which must be made by a court when it per-
forms a land planning function-the total impact upon the commu-
nity-are no different from the functions of a court as a super zoning
board. In fact the court must often weigh and measure conflicting
zoning plans to resolve a contested extraterritorial acquisition. 7 9
Therefore, one can conclude that the court should not adjudicate
174. See, for example, the classic zoning case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926). This was a suit brought by an owner of improved land who
sought relief from building restrictions which he argued deprived him of liberty and
property without due process of law. Mr. Justice Sutherland replied that "if the validity
of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control." Id. at 388. The ordinance was upheld.
175. 350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957).
176. Id. at 430-31, 86 N.W.2d at 169. (Emphasis added.)
177. 180 Cal. App. 2d 563, 4 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1960).
178. Id. at 570, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62.
179. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
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extraterritorial acquisitions which, as has been demonstrated,18 in-
evitably and necessarily require the court to function as a land plan-
ning body.
Although not critical to the conclusion, the reasons for not permit-
ting the court to assume this function are twofold. The first is that
the land planning function is legislative in nature, and the constitu-
tional separation of judicial and legislative powers requires abstention
on the part of the court.181 As Mr. Justice Holmes accurately ob-
served, "We fully understand . . . the very powerful argument that
can be made against the wisdom of the legislation, but on that point
we have nothing to say, as it is not our concern." 182 Secondly, the
courts are institutionally incapable of making a land planning deter-
mination.183 The adversary process, largely controlled by counsel and
limited to the witnesses they call, is not adaptable to a determination
of this nature. The court is functionally incapable of conducting in-
vestigations that require scientific planning and engineering tech-
niques. Not only does it not have the investigatory powers of the
legislature but it also does not have the facilities, budget, or time to
conceive a regional plan.184 Particularly is this true at the appellate
level, where the issues are generally law and policy rather than issues
of fact and the procedure is keyed to argument rather than to the
process of proof. Since, therefore, there does not appear to be a sub-
stantial difference between zoning and land planning, it is suggested
that the reasons which dictate against the court's acting as a zoning
body apply with equal force to the court's acting as a land planning
body.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the foregoing discussion it was observed that in cases of inter-
city conflict over extraterritorial zoning, courts have applied a test in
the nature of the governmental-proprietary distinction found prin-
cipally in the field of municipal tort liability. It was then seen that
this test has definite internal limitations and is wholly unsuited to the
adjudication of state-city or inter-city conflicts. It was further found
that courts in attempting to arrive at such a classification of functions
often find it necessary, at times imperative, to consider and weigh all
180. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
181. See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HAnv. L. REv. 40 (1961).
182. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), on rehearing, 219 U.S. 575,
580 (1911).
183. See ABRAHAm, Tim JuDIcrAL PnocEss 282-89 (1962); HunsT, THE Gnoiwi or
AmancAN LAw 180 (1950).




factors of the proposed and present use of the land and its total im-
pact on the region. It was then concluded that although land plan-
ning considerations must be treated, it is neither a proper nor a de-
sirable function of the judicial system to weigh them. The question
then becomes who should make this determination and with what
criteria.
The answer, with respect to state and inter-city conflicts, it is
thought, lies in the creation of a permanent state land planning
agency which would, among other functions, adjudicate conflicts be-
tween governmental units which arise from extraterritorial acquisi-
tions. No such administrative agency presently exists. Several states
have, however, created a state-level body which functions in the field
of land planning.18 Connecticut, for example, has a Development
Commission which, meeting but once a month, focuses primarily upon
the collection and dissemination of information concerning "industry,
business, commerce, agriculture, and recreational and residential facili-
ties. "186 New Jersey, with a different approach, created a Department
of Economic Development which performs not only the former duties
of the New Jersey State Planning Board 187 but also the function of ur-
ban housing rehabilitation, public works, and even veterans' services.1'
A desirable middle course is found, it is thought, in Tennessee, which
has a State Planning Commission that functions only as a land plan-
ning board. It has the responsibility of adopting a general plan for
the development of the state, advising and cooperating with the local
planning commissions, and coordinating the state plan with the state
regional areas.119 However, like other state agencies, it does not func-
tion continuously and is limited in its personnel since its members
must serve without compensation.19
The agency proposed here, unlike the ones just discussed, will be
a constantly functioning body whose members are full-time public
employees.' 91 Furthermore, it will be structured so that it is one step
185. See U.S. HousING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, COMPARATIVE DIGEST OF THE
PIIINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF STATE PLANNING LAwS (1959), which collects all the perti-
nent state statutes on land planning.
186. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 32-3 (1961).
187. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27c-5 (1955).
188. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27c-1 to -60 (1955).
189. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-101 to -114 (1956). See REGIONAL PLANNinG CoM-
MISSION FOR CLAImSViLLE, TENNESSEE, NEIaHBOanOOD ANALYSIS AND PLAN FOR RESI-
DENTIAL NmIGBORHOOD UNITS (1957).
190. TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-102 (1956).
191. Although no attempt will be made to treat all aspects of the commission, it is
recommended that the membership should be keyed to the recognizable geographical
districts in each state with one representative from each district. The selection of mem-
bers should be removed from the politics of the area and made appointive by the
governor of each state. The members should also hold office for life, subject to impeach-
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beyond the regional planning layout envisioned by the more far-
reaching state land planning enabling acts. 92 The agency will have
three basic functions. The first will be a planning function requiring
the creation of a state master plan and then the coordination with it
of state regional land plans and master plans. 193 Within this function
the agency will plan for state land use projects, such as state parks
and conservation areas,194 and will also work with other state land
planning commissions to coordinate and adopt area-wide projects. The
second basic function will be to serve as an advisor to the state legis-
lature and other groups in need of land allocation solutions which
affect areas larger than one region. This would include consultation
on such things as interstate compacts, special districts, bridges and
riparian rights to bodies of water affecting adjacent states, parks and
recreational areas which affect adjoining states or areas larger than
one region, and the conservation of open spaces which have a state-
wide impact. The third function, which no presently existing state
planning board exercises, is the one which is most important with
respect to the problems this paper has attempted to treat. It is the
adjudication of conflicts which arise when a municipality attempts to
appropriate state property, or property in another governmental unit,
or when one of these parties attempts a condemnation within a mu-
nicipality. In keeping with its other functions, the key to adjudication
of these types of conflicts should be the regional and state master
plans. The burden should be placed upon the condemnor and any
proposed change in land use should be compatible with existing and
anticipated land uses.
Although not within the scope of this paper, it would be remiss not
to comment on regional planning statutes, since the success of the
proposed state planning agency will be largely dependent upon them.
These statutes, currently found in thirty-one states,19 5 represent an
attempt to zone an area wider than the boundaries of one municipality
in an effort to reduce the conflicts between inconsistent zoning ordi-
nances196 and to give some direction to regional land planning efforts.
ment, thus giving the body the security of a court but still making it responsible to the
legislature.
192. See Haar, supra note 184, at 522, giving an evaluation of the types of regional
planning statutes which exist today and recommending needed changes in this type of
statute.
193. See BAss-rr, THE MASTER PLm. (1938), for a far-thinking discussion of com-
munity and land planning legislation.
194. See generally SIEGEL, THE LAw or OPEN SPAcCE (1960).
195. U.S. HousING AND Homm FiNANcE AcENcy, op. cit. supra note 185, at i.
196. An example of such a conflict is Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15
N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954), where the court had to resolve conflicting zoning ordi-
nances of adjacent boroughs. The court was forced to assume the position of a super
zoning body in order to resolve the conflict. As the trial court in that case had cor-
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They were adopted partly in recognition of the facts that city plan-
ning was obsolete 197 and that a new set of regional concepts and
institutions was needed if municipal governments were to be respon-
sive to the needs and desires of their inhabitants. 98 Unfortunately,
however, there has been little uniformity between state regional plan-
ning statutes, with the result that few of them, if any, function alike. 99
They vary from a required regional division and functioning regional
board 20 to optional plans which envision little more than county
planning.20 1 Not only is there a lack of uniformity among these stat-
utes but also the establishment of regional planning bodies is usually
on an optional basis.202 As a result little coordination is achieved
within these states. Still another criticism of these statutes is their
method of determining regional boundary lines. This determination,
which is by its nature somewhat arbitrary, is often made on a political
rather than a land planning basis. Despite these criticisms, a well
drafted statute, such as the California enabling act (which makes
regional commissions mandatory),20 3 will go far to alleviate many of
the problems now facing communities and cities throughout the
United States.
The creation of a state land planning agency to adjudicate intra-
state conflicts does not, however, resolve the problem of the out-of-
state-municipal and federal-municipal conflict. It is apparent that a
state agency would not be suitable, since neither the opposing state
nor the federal government would submit to its jurisdiction. This
problem can be resolved, it is submitted, by an interstate Regional
Development Commission structured along the lines McDougal and
Rotival propose in The Case for Regional Planning.204 As they sug-
gest, the Commission should be established by the federal govern-
ment in concert with the states of the geographical region such as the
rectly noted, "it is almost inevitable that the adjoining municipality will be affected in
some degree by the zoning regulations along its border adopted by its next door neigh-
bor." Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 43, 100 A.2d 182,
191 (1953).
197. Tugwell, The Real Estate Dilemma, 2 PuB. AD M N. REv. 27-40 (1942), cor-
rectly stated that "zoning can never be an effective implement in urban rehabilitation
because the courts will not sustain zoning laws which are strong enough to accomplish
major objectives in planning."
198. Ibid.
199. Haar, supra note 184, at 516.
200. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 65060-72.
201. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 9, §§ 2501-17 (1953).
202. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. Rnv. § 8-31 (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-6
(1940).
203. CAL. GOVT CODE ANN. § 65060.
204. McDouoAL & RomvL, THE CASE FOR BEGIONAL PLAxNIN (1947). See also
Garner, Some Aspects of Planning Law in England, 12 U. ToaoRTo L.J. 49 (1957),
which discusses the English approach by way of the Town and County Planning Act,
1947, 10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 51.
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Deep South, the Middle Atlantic States, or New England.215 Its form
would be that "of an administrative organization which will permit
the pooling of all the powers and resources necessary to effective
regional planning, without an over-concentration of power in the
federal government or a dampening of local and private initiative."2 0
The Commission would actually be a composite of previous attempts
toward regional solutions of multi-state problems-the informal co-
operative commission,2° 7 the interstate compact,208 and the federal
public corporation 209-none of which singly would effectively serve
the objective here sought. As to its membership, the Commission
would have representatives from each state in the region, from any
special body, such as the Port of New York Authority,210 and from
the federal government. Structurally it can be visualized as the apex
of a triangle from which the proposed state and local agencies would
descend. Like the state agency its functions would be threefold-
planning, advising, and adjudicating.211
Once the Commission is formed its first function will be to prepare
a master plan for the region and recommendations for changes and
activities at all levels of government. It will then have to coordinate
this plan with the local and state master plans. Next, and its most
important function for the problems raised in this paper, will be to
provide a forum for the conflicts between municipalities of different
states and between municipalities and the federal government, includ-
ing acquisitions by and in the municipality. The criteria for permit-
ting such acquisitions should be the same as that recommended for
intra-state conflicts-the total impact on the area. Such a recommenda-
tion would, of course, necessitate a modification in the inflexible
state of the law with regard to out-of-state and federal property. As
205. See also Sokolow, Governmental Techniques for the Conservation and Utilization
of Water Resources: An Analysis and Proposal, 56 YALE L.J. 276 (1947).
206. MCDOuGAL & Ro=nAL, op. cit. supra note 204, at 4.
207. Informal commissions have been formed largely to achieve harmonious programs
among federal agencies operating in regional areas. They function primarily through
channels of information and persuasion but lack the power to achieve any positive
programs. Id. at 68.
208. Interstate compacts such as the Port of New York Authority and the Colorado
River Compact have functioned successfully in their field. They are not, however,
adaptable to the more important task of continuous comprehensive planning and de-
velopment. They are inherently inflexible and too rigid for the Commission desired here.
209. The federal public corporation has achieved substantial success in the Tennessee
Valley Authority but is too central government oriented to produce the results antici-
pated for the Regional Commission. McDourAL & RoTnvAL, op. cit. supra note 204, at 6.
210. See BoLLEs, SP EcaL DisnucT Govmn-sn=.s in Tmi Ukrra_ STATES (1957).
211. McDougal and Rotival would approve a multilevel system of land planning
bodies as herein suggested. In fact they state: "The first great need is for the estab-
lishment of functional subareas-neighborhood units, metropolitan or rural districts, and
combinations of districts-for planning and development in lieu of the present more or
less arbitrary political units...." McDoUG;AL & RonVAr, op. cit. supra note 204, at 74.
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recalled from the earlier discussion of property which one munici-
pality (state) owns within the territorial confines of another state,
212 it
is held in purely a proprietary capacity and is subject to all the inci-
dents of ordinary individual ownership.2 13 This position of absolute
control by the territorial state is unnecessary and in the situation
where state lines are artificial and defy natural growth patterns the
municipality (state) in which a city owns land for a public purpose
should not be permitted to condemn these properties without giving
cause. In the same manner, federal control over its property should
not be absolute.214 At present the power of a municipality to condemn
federal lands within or without its territorial limits is in all cases
denied, unless consented to by the federal government, regardless of
the existing federal use and the municipality's need for the property.
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There appears, however, no good reason why federally owned prop-
erty, whether of a governmental or proprietary nature, should not be
subject to reasonable condemnation proceedings of surrounding mu-
nicipalities. As in the case of all other condemnations discussed, the
burden would be upon the condemnor to demonstrate a more critical
need and in the case of federal property used for a governmental
purpose such as defense, that a feasible alternative area exists.
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Once the determination by either the state agency or the regional
commission is made, a question still remains as to whether or not
appellate review to the courts should be permitted. To recommend
such review would appear to thrust the courts back into the position
of decision-maker, a position they have assumed in the present power
vacuum. This result, however, can be avoided by requiring any ap-
peal of an adjudication of the state agency to be made to the regional
commission where, hopefully, it will be finally resolved. If, however,
a party is still not satisfied, appeal could be permitted to the state or
federal courts as their jurisdictions permit. However, once in the
courts, the role of the judiciary should be limited to procedural con-
212. See text at note 62 supra.
213. 1 NICHOLS § 2.23.
214. In some of the earlier cases, e.g., United States v. Chicago, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
185 (1849), the validity of the exercise of the right of eminent domain by a state over
the lands of the United States had received recognition. Today, however, we have
reached a point where the states have no power with respect to these lands. Neither
outcome, it is admitted, is desirable. See 1 NicHoLs § 2.22 for prior history.
215. See, e.g., Davenport v. Three-Fifths of an Acre of Land, 252 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.
1958).
216. See In re Certain Land in Lawrence, 119 Fed. 453 (D. Mass. 1902), where the
court said: "I do not believe that the United States could, at its will, build this post
office in the middle of the principal street . . . or across the main line of an important
railroad. I do not think that the right of the public to prevent the first-mentioned
taking can be vindicated only by the attorney general. I doubt if it can be laid down,
without qualification, that the public use of a post office is in all places superior to the
public use of a park." Id. at 456.
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siderations-prejudicial administration, abuses of discretion, or a fail-
ure of procedural due process-all of which are tested against the
background of the relationship and policies established in the state
and regional master plans.
Within this framework of regional planning statutes, a state plan-
ning agency, and regional Development Commissions, it is hopefully
anticipated that the forum for conflicts between cities and other gov-
ernmental units, arising from the appropriation of land, will be shifted
from the courts to the agency. A body institutionally capable of per-
forming a land planning function can adjudicate conflicts without the
structural inhibitions of the judiciary as it maximizes land use to its
highest social utility.
